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APPROPRIATIONS REDUX: A CRITICAL LOOK
AT THE FISCAL YEAR 1988
CONTINUING RESOLUTION
NEAL E. DEVINS*
On January 25, 1988, in his State of the Union Address, President
Reagan blasted Congress for the budget process culminating in the Fiscal
Year 1988 (FY 88) continuing resolution.1 Contending that "[m]ost of
you in this chamber didn't know what was in this [2100-page] catch all
bill and [accompanying conference] report," the President boldly pro-
claimed that he would not sign "another one of these."'2 This damning
statement, rather than inciting the hostility associated with unfounded
accusations, provoked the wild appreciation associated with a minister
preaching to the faithful. Indeed, since Congress's passage of the resolu-
tion, pledges of support for the President's stand have been made by
enough Congressmen and Senators to sustain such a veto.3
There is good reason to dislike the FY 88 continuing resolution: the
bill shattered Congress's reputation as a deliberative body. Fearing the
imminent shutdown of the government,4 Congress adopted internal rules
to preclude debate and amendment and effectively to deny access to the
final version of the bill.5 In essence, the resolution appears the secretive
work-product of powerful legislators and their aides.
This article's concern is the recent proliferation of continuing reso-
lutions and the legal issues associated with that proliferation-matters
that received only scant attention in my earlier piece on limitation rid-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary;
Research Fellow, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, College of William and Mary.
Thanks are owed to Mark Pearson, Greg Tolbert and Susan Winchell for exceptional research
assistance, and to Lou Fisher for valuable commentary.
I. Continuing resolutions are funding devices enacted whenever Congress is unable to pass
one or more of the thirteen regular appropriation bills by the end of the budget cycle. See L.
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 143 (1975). Continuing resolutions are necessitated by
Antideficiency Act provisions that demand that appropriated funds fuel governmental programs.
See 31 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982).
2. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 24 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 85, 87 (Jan. 25, 1988).
3. See, eg., Hook, Reagan's Attack on Pork-Fed Mega-Bils Stakes a Responsive Chord in Con-
gress, 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 190, 191 (1988).
4. Without some interim spending measure passed by the end of the fiscal year, nonessential
governmental operation would cease. See 31 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982).
5. See generally ihfra notes 48-72 and accompanying text.
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ers.6 In reviewing the causes and contents of last year's continuing reso-
lution, this article will not altogether remove the negative cast put on
continuing resolutions. 7 At the same time, this article will pay attention
to those features in the existing budget process that make continuing res-
olutions inevitable and somewhat beneficial." It will also explore
whether omnibus legislation subverts the President's veto power9 and
whether some notion of "due process in lawmaking" demands that
lawmakers have an opportunity to read and debate a bill before they vote
on it. 10 Finally, this article will consider this type of single-year legisla-
tion's propensity to raise bill of attainder and equal protection
problems."1
I. CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS: WHY, How AND WHAT'S WRONG?
The awesome dimensions of the FY 88 continuing resolution have
provoked a firestorm of criticism both inside 12 and outside 13 Congress.
The resolution's alleged failings include: (1) changing the balance of
power within Congress, 14 (2) undermining the President's veto,1 5 (3) en-
6. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE LJ.
456.
7. See infra notes 47-75 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 12-46 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 117-54 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 76-116 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 155-92 and accompanying text.
12. See supra note 3; see also HOUSE DEMOCRATIC STUDY GROUP, CONTINUING RESOLU-
TIONS, SPECIAL REP. No. 30, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH
COMM., CRs AND OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS: PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENT (1987) (prepared
by Kathy Ormiston, Senior Economics Analyst, House Republican Research Committee).
13. See, eg., Editorial, What a Way to Run a Government, ECONOMIST, Dec. 26, 1987, at 31-
33; Editorial, Megabills.... Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 1987, at A14, col. 1.
14. In particular, the Appropriations Committee's power is substantially augmented by contin-
uing resolutions. As Allen Schick demonstrates in a report prepared for the Task Force on the
Budget Process, the only real limit on the Appropriations Committee's role is the work previously
completed on one or more of the regular appropriation bills. COMMITrEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE WHOLE AND THE PARTS: PIECEMEAL AND INTEGRATED AP-
PROACHES TO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING 37-39 (1987). When regular bills are incomplete, the
Appropriations Committee has wide discretion in defining the content and scope of the resolution.
Id. at 37. For example, in the House, members of the Appropriations Committee and the Rules
Committee, working together, can fill the continuing resolution with legislation and new funding and
then protect it from opponents. Members of these committees do this by writing the continuing
resolution to their liking while it is with the Appropriations Committee and then restricting debate
and amendment of the resolution while it is on the floor through procedural rules established by the
Rules Committee. See id. For a description of how such rules affected the FY 88 resolution, see
infra notes 48-51. If Rules Committee restrictions are rejected, however, floor amendments can
displace Appropriations Committee control. In 1985, after the rejection of restrictive rules, the
House inserted the 200-page Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 into the resolution and the
Senate accepted 125 of 158 amendments offered to it. COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra, at 38.
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couraging special-interest legislation, 16 and (4) preventing effective con-
gressional consideration of the resolution's multifarious provisions
through restrictions on amendment to, debate on, and access to the bill. 17
Appropriations Committee members also wield enormous influence in conference, where recon-
ciliation of House and Senate bills occurs. In the case of continuing resolutions, this influence is
acute because fear of the imminent shutdown of the government forces the near-immediate approval
of these resolutions' conference reports. lId For further discussion of parliamentary conditions, see
R. KEITH, AN OVERVIEW OF THE USE OF CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS 5-6 (Congressional Re-
search Service 1980). Several members of Congress have criticized this expanded role for the Appro-
priations and Rules Committees. For Congressman Byron Dorgan, continuing resolutions
deny each representative the chance to vote on which programs to cut, which to freeze and
which to increase. That is left to a handful of members on the Appropriations Committee
and I believe that abrogates both the responsibility and privilege of each Member to repre-
sent his or her constituents.
133 CONG. REc. E4688 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1987); see also 133 CONG. REc. H10,907 (daily ed. Dec. 3,
1987) (remarks of Rep. Michel). For a description of Appropriations Committee Conferees' role in
the FY 88 continuing resolution, see infra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
16. Critics of the continuing resolution claim that it is a ripe target for the inclusion of "pork
barrel" projects. The Appropriations Committee's willingness to include amendments to ensure ap-
proval, combined with limitations on debate and amendment, explains this phenomenon. COMMIT-
TEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 14, at 38-39. Not
surprisingly, the inclusion of such pork barrel projects is subject to attack. In his 1988 State of the
Union Address, for example, President Reagan chastised Congress for the continuing resolution's
inclusion of such projects as "cranberry research, the study of crawfish and the commercialization of
wild flowers." See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, supra
note 2, at 87. Other "special interest" legislation subject to attack includes $8 million for Parisian
schools for North African Jews, $25 million for an airport in House Speaker Wright's district, and a
limitation rider forcing Rupert Murdoch to sell his newspapers in markets where he also owns televi-
sion stations. See Anti-Murdoch Provision in Funding Bill Sparks Flap, 46 CONG. Q. WEEKI.Y REP.
87 (1988). For further discussion of the Murdoch rider, see infra notes 157-59 and accompanying
text. For additional examples of pork in the 1988 continuing resolution, see generally Congress is
Out of Control, READER's DIG., May 1988, at 181 (compilation of newspaper reports of pork barrel
projects). For an explanation of why these pork projects would be beyond the reach of an item veto,
see L. Fisher, Micromanagement by Congress: Reality and Mythology (Apr. 8, 1988) (unpublished
paper presented at conference sponsored by American Enterprise Institute).
The President, through the Office of Management and Budget, produced a list of "wasteful"
items in the FY 88 continuing resolution. The Democrats characterize this list as an overstatement
both because of its inclusion of "essential" programs and because $970 million is less than two-tenths
of one percent of the $605 billion appropriation. HousE DEMOCRATIC STUDY GROUP, supra note
12, at 10-11.
One interesting aftershock of the State of the Union Address concerned Senator Daniel Inouye,
who admitted to having made an "error in judgment" and moved to rescind the $8 million
earmarked for Parisian schools for North African Jews. 134 CONG. REc. S315 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
1988); see Act of Feb. 16, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-251, 102 Stat. 17 (enacting Sen. Inouye's motion).
17. See generally infra notes 48-72. In this connection, concern has also been voiced about
disruption of the legislative process. Typifying these remarks, Congressman Butler Derrick warned
in 1984:
[W]e cannot continue to operate around here in a manner which ignores the normal legisla-
tive process-in which all our real work is done on appropriation bills and, in particular,
on the continuing resolution. It is not fair to the authorizing committees which see their
work go down the drain as all attention is focused on the appropriation bills... it is
damaging to the integrity of the legislative process.
130 CONG. REc. H9895 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1984).
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These allegations have led Democrats and Republicans alike to condemn
continuing resolutions.18 Yet, a confluence of phenomena make contin-
ued use of this funding mechanism likely.
A. The Emergence of Continuing Resolutions.
Congress passed the first continuing resolution in 1876, providing
funding for certain government accounts for ten days. 19 Since 1954,
Congress has passed at least one continuing resolution each year.20 Until
1981, continuing resolutions were confined to interim spending meas-
ures.21 Since then, however, the use, scope and size of these measures
has dramatically expanded. 22 Today, continuing resolutions provide full-
year funding for many (and sometimes all) federal operations2 3 and serve
as a repository of unrelated legislation.24
While the appropriations process25 has always served as a last op-
Continuing resolutions are also problematic because they disrupt normal government opera-
tions. Federal employees left in the dark about their agency's funding frequently abandon "appro-
priated" work and turn their attention to a job search. See Hearings on Continuing Resolutions
Before the House Republican Research Comm, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. - (1987) [hereinafter Dec.
16, 1987 Hearings] (forthcoming) (statement of Neal Devins).
18. The Democratic Study Group and Republican Research Committee both argue for the
abandonment of omnibus continuing resolutions, although the Democrats advocate self-restraint and
the Republicans favor a change of House rules. See HOUSE DEMOcRATIC STUDY GROUP, supra
note 12, at 13-14; HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH COMM., supra note 12, at 4.
19. Act of April 17, 1876, 19 Stat. 65. "The 1876 resolution incorporated the two basic ele-
ments found in [pre-1981] continuing resolutions: (1) a fixed duration (ten days) and (2) a maximum
level of funding ('proportional' for the ten-day period to the appropriations made available the previ-
ous year)." R. KEITH, supra note 14, at 7. For an overview of pre-1981 practices, see id. at 7-11.
20. See R. KEITH, supra note 14, at 8; see also UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS AND AN ASSESSMENT OF AUTOMATIC FUNDING APPROACHES
14-24 (1986) [hereinafter GAO].
21. As such they were fairly simple, providing funding for a short period of time, normally less
than three months, at a rate of spending usually defined as the lower of the previous year's rate, the
President's rate, or the rate in the House- or Senate-passed appropriation. COMMITTEE ON THE
BUDGET, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 14, at 34; see also L. FISHER, supra note 1,
at 143-46 (describing complexities in determining the appropriate rate).
22. According to the GAO, from 1960 to 1985, "the amount of detail and the resulting number
of pages in continuing resolutions increased at least a hundredfold." See GAO, supra note 20, at 14.
See generally id. at 14-18; Keith & Davis, Lines and Items, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Spring 1985,
at 97, 99 (describing growth in number of pages).
23. See generally S. STREETCAR, REGULAR APPROPRIATIONS ENACTED SEPARATELY AND IN
CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1977-1987 (Congressional Research Service 1987).
24. For a discussion of the FY 1988 continuing resolution, see infra notes 47-72. For a discus-
sion of legislative amendments to the continuing resolutions for Fiscal Years 1983-1985, see Devins,
supra note 6, at 470. Pre-1981 legislative amendments financed combat activities in Southeast Asia,
the Federal Trade Commission, U.S. aid to Iran, and federally funded abortions. R. KEITH, supra
note 14, at 17-18. Unlike post-1981 enactments, which often included free-standing substantive pro-
visions, pre-1981 efforts were confined to limitation riders.
25. See generally COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra
note 14, at 38-39; A. SCHICK, LEGISLATION, APPROPRIATIONS, AND BUDGETS: THE DEVELOP-
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portunity for the enactment of substantive measures that have failed
either in committee or on the floor,26 post-1981 continuing resolutions
starkly contrast with prior practices. The differences have resulted from
the conglomeration of multiple unenacted appropriations, substantive
legislation, and time pressures that severely limit congressional delibera-
tion.27 The post-1981 continuing resolutions do not reflect a considered
legislative judgment. Instead, a combination of forces-most notably the
1974 Budget Act28 and the Gramm-Rudman Deficit Control Act29-has
interacted to make "behemoth" 30 continuing resolutions inevitable.
The 1974 Budget Act was a response to Congress's perceived loss of
power to the President, demonstrated particularly by the Executive's re-
fusal to spend appropriated funds during the Johnson and Nixon admin-
istrations. 31 Prior to the Budget Act's enactment, Congress, upon
receiving comprehensive budget recommendations from the President,
was expected to coordinate its revenue and spending decisions with those
MENT OF SPENDING DECISION-MAKING IN CONGRESS 14-19 (Congressional Research Service
1984); Devins, supra note 6; Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal
Rules and Informal Practices, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 51 (1979).
26. As Senator Warren Magnuson, who chaired the Senate Appropriations Committee, ob-
served in 1979: "When you cannot get anything through a legislative committee, you tack it on an
appropriation bill." 125 CONG. REc. 25,426 (1979); see also 130 CONG. REc. S12,137 (daily ed.
Sept. 27, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield) ("[The Senate should not] get into that interminable situa-
tion as we have in the past ... of loading up this appropriations bill with legislative riders.... This is
not the place to start trying to transfer all the unfinished legislative calendar to the appropriations
calendar.") Moreover, unlike the situation with regular authorizations, "extraneous provisions may
bypass all or much of the normal legislative process. Committee hearings, a mark-up floor debate,
and floor amendments, which temper and improve legislative pr6posals, might be avoided." The
Budget Reconciliation Process; The Inclusion of Unrelated Matters: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on the Legislation Process of the House Comm. on Rules, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1987) (statement of
Robert Reischauer); accord A. SCHICK, supra note 25, at 55-59.
27. One procedural factor contributing to this development is that, under House rules, the bar
against legislation in appropriation bills does not apply to continuing resolutions. See A. SCHICK,
supra note 25, at 58.
28. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat.
297.
29. The "Gramm-Rudman Act," the Balanced Budget Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1986. Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986). The Court ruled that the Act improperly delegated to the Comptroller Gen-
eral-an official of the legislative branch-the responsibility of determining for the President the
monies to be sequestered under the Act. This constitutional defect was addressed in the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, see. 102,
§ 252, see. 103, § 253, 101 Stat. 754, 764-75 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 902-907, 922). For an
extensive treatment of this enactment, see E. DAVIS & R. KEITH, DEBT-Limrr INCREASE AND 1985
BALANCED BUDGET ACT REAFFIRMATION: SUMMARY OF PUBLIC LAW 100-119 (JF RES. 324)
(Congressional Research Service 1987).
30. This phrase is borrowed from the President's State of the Union Address. See Address
Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, supra note 2, at 87.
31. See generally L. FISHER, supra note 1, at 175-97.
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recommendations. 32 The President was supposed to be responsible for
overall budget aggregates, with Congress retaining the right to set priori-
ties within those aggregates. 33 Presidential impoundments disrupted this
balance. By withholding appropriations, the President sought to control
aggregates and priorities.
The Budget Act contained a number of provisions designed to
strengthen congressional control over fiscal affairs. Under the Act, presi-
dential rescissions of appropriated funds require approval by both the
Senate and House. 34 The President could defer the spending of funds,
subject to a one-house veto.35 The Act also created Budget Committees
in the House and Senate, 36 established a Congressional Budget Office to
supply technical support,37 and required the adoption of budget resolu-
tions to set overall limits on budget aggregates (such as total outlays and
revenues) and permit debate on spending priorities.38 Since 1974, Con-
gress, in formulating its budget resolution, has often applied policy, eco-
nomic and technical assumptions different from those presented in the
executive budget.39
The principle consequence of this transformation proved to be fiscal
irresponsibility. The 1974 Act hinged on a centralized process (the
budget resolution). Congress, unlike the quintessentially centralized Ex-
ecutive, is strongly decentralized. Consequently, as Louis Fisher has ob-
served, "[i]nstead of staying within the President's aggregates, Members
of Congress could vote on generous ceilings in a budget resolution and
then announce to their constituents that they had 'stayed within the
budget.' "40 Furthermore, the President, by manipulating his aggregates
32. At the same time, Congress was allowed to increase or decrease the President's budget by a
simple majority vote. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20.
33. See L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
226-27 (1985).
34. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
§§ 1012, 1017, 88 Stat. 297, 333-34, 337-39.
35. Id. § 1013, 88 Stat. at 334-335. The Supreme Court struck down one-house legislative
vetoes in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
36. Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 101-102, 88 Stat. at 299-302.
37. Id. §§ 201-203, 88 Stat. at 302-305.
38. Id. §§ 302, 305, 88 Stat. at 306-308, 310-312. Through the use of a congressional budget
adopted in concurrent resolutions, Congress sets "macro" policy and allocates the outlays and
budget authority among a number of broad categories (e.g., national defense, health, agriculture).
Specific programs are still supposed to be formulated and funded through the regular appropriation
bills, but within the broad outlines of the budget resolution. A. SCHICK, supra note 25, at 41-43.
39. A. SCHICK, R. KEITH, E. DAVIS, MANUAL ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 5 (Con-
gressional Research Service 1987).
40. L. FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 206 (2d
ed. 1987).
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to accommodate policy preferences, submitted unrealistic budgets to
Congress.
By 1985, budget deficits were so outrageous that Congress felt com-
pelled to act. Its solution was the peculiar Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Deficit Control Act. Gramm-Rudman represents something of a hybrid.
In enacting it, Congress was no longer willing to trust its internal budget-
ary process, yet it also refused to trust the President.4 ' Consequently,
both in Gramm-Rudman's original form and in its 1987 reincarnation,
an automatic sequestration procedure ensures that the budget conforms
to deficit reduction targets.42
This procedure makes the ongoing use of continuing resolutions a
near-certainty.4 3 Under this scheme, it is to the clear disadvantage of
appropriations subcommittees to bring their bills forward. Because some
cuts in a committee's appropriation may be necessitated as the committee
struggles to meet deficit reduction goals in subcommittee, Gramm-Rud-
man sequestration may function as an additional penalty for timely ac-
tion. As David Obey, chairman of an appropriations subcommittee,
explained on the House floor:
I warn you, even though people will give us these pious pronounce-
ments now supporting 13 individual appropriations bills, so long as
Gramm-Rudman is on the books there is an incentive for every com-
mittee around here not to bring their bill out to floor, because even if
they cut their own bill and meet the spending limitations required
under a budget resolution, that does not guarantee that every other
committee will perform, and so they can wind up having their bill cut
twice.44
Waiting is sensible also because economic projections that determine the
size of any budget reduction may improve and therefore minimize the
size of cuts or negate them altogether.
The current system therefore encourages last minute action.45 Con-
41. See Brooks, Gramm-Rudman: Can Congress and the President Pass This Buck?, 64 TEx. L.
REv. 131, 131 (1985) (labeling Act "a wholesale abdication of constitutional responsibility").
42. See E. DAvis & R. KEITH, supra note 29, at 17.
43. The following analysis parallels Fisher, Continuing Resolutions: Can't Live With 'em, Can't
Live Without 'em, 48 PuB. BUDGETING & FIN. 101 (1988).
44. 134 CONG. REC. H68-69 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1988).
45. The influence of Gramm-Rudman and the 1974 Budget Act procedures is not the sole
explanation for the prevalence of continuing resolutions. Budgetary conflict and political advantage
also contribute to the growth. See generally COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, supra note 14, at 35-36. Budgetary conflict-fueled from 1981 through 1987 by disa-
greement between the Democrat-controlled House and Republican-controlled Senate-refers to the
difficulty of adopting the budget resolution that sets the guidelines for individual appropriations. Id.
at 35. Political advantage concerns the Appropriations Committee's desire to control the exposure
of its bill both to floor amendment and White House veto. Id. at 36. On occasion, however, the
Appropriations Committee has lost control of both the floor amendment and presidential veto. In
FY 88, the President's threat to veto the continuing resolution yielded the inclusion of Contra aid
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gress will have to abandon Gramm-Rudman before it can get out of the
continuing resolution mess.46
B. The FY 88 Continuing Resolution.
The FY 88 continuing resolution exemplifies both the best and the
worst features of omnibus legislation.47 On the downside, effective delib-
eration was undermined by limitations on debate and amendment and by
severe restrictions on opportunities to review the resolution's conference
report. Moreover, a massive amount of unrelated legislation was at-
tached to the bill. On the other hand, in light of competing interests
within Congress and the executive's policy preferences, an omnibus mea-
sure was necessary to reach a compromise. Because it can paint with
broad strokis, the continuing resolution yields a more "palatable" legis-
lative work-product.
1. Limitations on Deliberation and Legislative Provisions. The
threat of an imminent shutdown of the federal government that makes
continuing resolutions "must pass" legislation also gives rise to numer-
ous irregularities in the enactment of such measures. House and Senate
consideration of the FY 88 continuing resolution exemplifies this
problem.
The process by which the measure was to be handled in the House
was a substantial bone of contention, particularly for minority Mem-
bers.48 Enactment of the so-called "CR Rule' 49 limited general debate to
one hour and placed extreme limits both on the number of amendments
and on debates concerning those amendments.50 Only seven amend-
and the exclusion of the fairness doctrine. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text; see also
COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 14, at 38 (discussing
FY 85 resolution, where floor amendments subverted Appropriations Committee control).
46. For a discussion of reform proposals, see E. DAVIS & R. KEITH, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
PROCESS REFORM (Congressional Research Service 1987); HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH COMM.,
supra note 12, at 4; Fisher, supra note 43, at 104.
47. The FY 85 continuing resolution is also instructive. For an extensive review of the legisla-
tive history of this measure, see E. DAVIS & R. KEITH, SUMMARY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
PUBLIC LAW 98-473: CONTINUING APPROPRIATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1985 (Congressional Re-
search Service 1984); see also Devins, supra note 6, at 469-70.
48. Republican opposition is exemplified by statements made at the December 1987 hearings of
the House Republican Research Committee. For example, Congressman Mickey Edwards com-
plained that "[u]nder continuing resolutions, [ ] regular order is suspended and replaced by some-
thing akin to ideological martial law, in which only a handful of elite decisionmakers fully
understand which programs and special projects get funded, and why." Dec. 16, 1987 Hearings,
supra note 17, at 2.
49. See 133 CONG. REC. H10,900-10 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1987) (debates on H.R. Res. 321, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H10,900 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1987)).
50. Three amendments were considered to have been approved upon adoption of the rule: (I)
an exemption for members of Congress from the pay increase for federal employees; (2) a prohibition
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ments could be considered for adoption, and these amendments were
"not amendable except as specified in the report and [were] not subject to
a demand for a division of the question." 51 The subject-matter and time
restrictions on these amendments included:
1) two versions of an amendment to delay imposition of sanctions
under the Clear Air Act (30 minutes of debate each); 2) the fairness
doctrine (30 minutes of debate); 3) prohibiting assistance to Haiti (30
minutes of debate); 4) prohibiting funds from being used to have Japa-
nese contractors on public works or public building jobs (30 minutes of
debate).52
In light of the significance of these amendments, the time restrictions
seem remarkable.
Needless to say, there was considerable opposition to the CR Rule.
As Congressman Lawrence Coughlin remarked: "[W]ith the rule just
adopted we have effectively refused to consider spending reductions but
have ensured ... a full platter of other legislative initiatives that should
be considered separately and on their merits .... ,,53 Further, as revealed
by the following statement by Congressman Silvio Conte, some Members
opposed the inclusion of new legislation: .
What especially troubles me, is that the continuing resolution also con-
tains reference to three bills ... that have not previously been before
the House. In this resolution, there will be no opportunity for amend-
ments to those three bills-just one vote, up or down, on some of the
most controversial issues in the Federal budget.54
The Senate, unencumbered by the CR Rule,55 considered seventy-
seven amendments to the bill. Senate amendments ranged from the ob-
scure-permitting Southwest Airways to provide service between Love
Field, Texas and Witchita, Kansas- 5 6 to the monumental-Contra
of transportation regulation calling for foreign repair stations for U.S. airlines; and (3) a provision
stating that amounts provided for defense and nondefense domestic spending could be adjusted to
accord with the outcome of the budget sumnnit. Id. at H10,900 (remarks of Rep. Derrick). For a
description of the budget summit, see infra note 74.
51. 133 CONG. REc. H10,900-901 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1987) (remarks of Rep. Derrick).
52. Id. at H10,901.
53. Id. at H10,916 (remarks of Rep. Coughlin); see also id. at H10,907 (remarks of Rep.
Michel); id. at H10,909 (remarks of Rep. Frenzel).
54. Id. at H10,914 (remarks of Rep. Conte); 133 CONG. REc. E3713 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1987)
(remarks of Rep. Jeffords) (characterizing continuing resolution as "an abdication of our fiscal
responsibility").
55. In explaining differences between House and Senate procedures, Janet Hook of Congres-
sional Quarterly notes: "Designed to be the deliberative body that counterbalances the impetuous
House, the Senate gives its leaders few of the tools for managing debate that the House's rules gives
its Democratic leadership." Hook, G.O.P. Chafes Under Restrictive House Rules, 45 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 2449, 2450 (1987).
56. Amend. No. 1331, discussed in 133 CONG. REc. S17,886 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1987).
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aid.57 Unlike the House, where abuse of process concerns dominated de-
bate, the Senate focused primarily on expediting the process so as not to
interfere with Congress's Christmas adjournment. Typifying this senti-
ment is Senator Bennett Johnson's comment that
we simply, if we are going to get out of here by Christmas, cannot take
every amendment that comes along .... We simply cannot allow
unending debate so that every Senator who wants to make statement
[sic] on any amendment can go on to his heart's content. Either we
leave by Christmastime and curtail this debate and curtail the amend-
ments or we do not.58
In order to meet their objective of streamlining and expediting the pro-
cess, the Senators unanimously agreed to a series of devices that enabled
them to consider all seventy-seven amendments in one day.59
After Senate and House action, the bill went into conference, where
House and Senate Appropriations Committee members resolved differ-
ences between Congress and the White House.60 The critical battles at
the conference stage involved Contra aid and the fairness doctrine. The
President insisted that he would sign the bill only after the inclusion of
Contra aid and the exclusion of the fairness doctrine. 61 By standing firm
on both matters, the President prevailed. 62 The President also used his
57. Amend. No. 1339, discussed in 133 CONG. REc. at S17,910. Other amendments include:
No. 1280, discussed in 133 CONG. REc. at S17,808 (regarding funding for the development of a
permanently manned civilian space center); No. 1283, discussed in 133 CONG. Ric. at S17,814 (al-
lowing certain associations of football coaches to have a qualified pension plan); No. 1299, discussed
in 133 CONG. REc. at S17,854 (clarifying the count of children under the Education of the Handi-
capped Act); No. 1281, discussed in 133 CONG. REC. at S17,811 (extending time for imposing sanc-
tions under the Clean Air Act).
58. 133 CONG. REC. at S17,798.
59. See id. at S17,799 (remarks of Sen. Byrd); a. at S17,805 (remarks of Sen. Johnston).
60. See Calmes, Reagan Wins Concessions in Final Funding Bill, 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
3185, 3186 (1987).
61. See id. at 3185.
62. As summarized by Jacqueline Caimes: "On both issues an exhausted Congress, led by
Democrats but squeezed between the president's veto threats and the approach of Christmas, re-
treated from confrontations." Id. at 3185. For further discussion of the fairness doctrine, see The
Rise and Fall of the Fairness Doctrine, Part IM" The President Stands Firm, BROADCASTING, Dec.
28, 1987, at 31.
While the President was quite successful in his use of the veto power, a resolution designed to
preserve the veto was introduced on the Senate floor. S. Res. 1835, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133
CONG. REC. S15,584 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1987); see also 133 CONG. RIc. S17,846-47 (daily ed. Dec.
11, 1987) (same resolution proposed as amendment to continuing resolution). Titled the Individual
Appropriations Act, this resolution called for separating appropriations bills tied together in a con-
tinuing resolution into individual titles before sending them to the President. In support of this
resolution, Senator Daniel Evans commented:
No one, either the current President or future Presidents, could afford to engage in a veto
knowing that the Government of the United States would literally come to a halt if he
exercised that veto.... With [this resolution,] we address ... the constitutional imbalance
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veto threat to preserve funds for anti-abortion counseling 63 and for for-
eign assistance. 64 The President, however, did have to swallow $23 bil-
lion in tax increases. 65
Conferees also negotiated a ban on smoking on domestic flights of
two hours or less, 66 a plan to allow states to raise the speed limit on rural
highways to 65 miles per hour,67 an extension of the Clean Air Act,68
and a limitation rider (introduced in conference) prohibiting the FCC
from modifying its cross-ownership regulations.69 Finally, House confer-
ees agreed to put off discussion on farm subsidies and Senate amend-
ments concerning Medicare payments. 70 In short, to keep the
government funded for another year, a handful of conferees settled a
wide spectrum of policy issues in eight days.
The final product included $603.9 billion in appropriations and was
more than 2100 pages long (comprising a 1057-page bill and a 1053-page
conference report). Completed at 10:45 p.m. on December 22, "[tlhe bill
was lugged in boxes to the House floor first, and then to the Senate. 71
Within five hours, the Senate and the House agreed to the measure. 72 In
light of these time constraints, Members-despite the massive changes
made to the bill in conference-did not have an opportunity to read the
bill. The President signed the bill the following morning.
2. The Need for Compromise. Policymaking without the benefit
of review by authorizing committees with appropriate subject-matter ex-
pertise, displacement of critical fiscal policy issues by substantive policy
concerns, extraordinary limitations on legislative debate and amendment,
and the conferral of enormous power on conferees suggest that the FY 88
continuing resolution is at least undemocratic and may well represent
created by sending the President a $500 billion-plus continuing resolution and saying "take
it or leave it."
133 CONG. Rnc. at S15,584. On the other hand, this proposal-by increasing the likelihood of
selective vetoes-threatens the delicate balance critical to the creation of the continuing resolution.
See Fisher, supra note 43, at 101-02.
63. See Rovner, Many Labor-HHS Programs in Fund Increase, 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
10, 11 (1988) (Contra aid).
64. See Calmes, supra note 60, at 3186.
65. See Hook, Budget Deal Enacted at Last, Congress Adjourns, 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
3183 (1987).
66. See Starobin, Rural Speed Limit Can Be Raised: Transportation Spending Plan Bans Smok-
ing on Brief Flights, 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 14 (1988).
67. See id
68. Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 StaL 1329-199 (1987).
69. See infra note 157.
70. See Hook, supra note 65, at 3184.
71. See Calmes, supra note 60, at 3186.
72. See i& at 3185.
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poor policy. 7 Nevertheless, there is a silver-if not entirely redeeming-
lining to this black cloud. In light of this year's deficit reduction goals,74
an omnibus measure might have been the only compromise vehicle avail-
able to Congress. As Louis Fisher observes:
Think of the alternative. Could the agreement have been implemented
by passing 13 regular appropriations bills and perhaps another dozen
bills to replace the giant reconciliation measure? Would that have
been manageable in Congress? ... [Moreover,] sending Reagan two
dozen bills would have increased his opportunity to veto them. That
sounds good for presidential prerogatives, but it would have threatened
the [needed] cooperation . . .75
Until the budget process is reformed, continuing resolutions-aside
from being inevitable-force conferees to play the necessary leadership
role that the 1974 Act divests from the President. These continuing reso-
lutions, unfortunately, come at an enormous cost. Centralization in
budgeting must be accomplished without the helter-skelter and undemo-
cratic process that pushes omnibus continuing resolutions forward.
II. DuE PROCESS IN LAWVMAKING
The idea of lawmakers voting on megalegislation without full
knowledge of its content is (to say the least) disquieting. Aside from
good government objections, 76 this practice pierces the post-Lochner 77
veil of legislative validity. The question remains, however, whether the
Constitution mandates some minimal safeguards to ensure the trustwor-
thiness of the legislative process.
The presumptive validity of legislative decisionmaking in the social
73. These complaints parallel criticism of policymaking through limitation riders. See Devins,
supra note 6, at 464-65.
74. After the October 1987 stock market crash, White House and congressional negotiators
agreed to reduce the deficit by $76 billion over FY 88 and 89. See Hook, supra note 65, at 3183.
This so-called "budget summit" contributed to the need to enact an omnibus continuing resolution.
First, since the summit did not conclude until November 20, there simply was not enough time to
enact separate bills. Second, the enactment of separate bills would have encouraged the President's
veto of both nonfavored legislation (for overexpenditure) and favored legislation (for
underexpenditure).
75. Fisher, supra note 43, at 101-02. For similar reasons, Senator Mark Hatfield endorsed this
year's continuing resolution: "[Tlhis year it may be just as well [that we not enact separate bills], for
now we have before us a single omnibus bill to implement the discretionary spending provisions of
the joint leadership agreement on the budget." 133 CONG. REc. S17,797 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1987).
76. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
77. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The practice also makes a mockery of assertions
in Chadha that "legislation by the national Congress [must] be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliber-
ative process" because the Framers insisted that "the legislative power of the Federal Government
be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure." INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
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and economic spheres is well known. Williamson v. Lee Optical 78 and
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York 79 reveal the Court's willing-
ness to ascribe legitimating rationgles to seemingly arbitrary classifica-
tions.8o Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.81 emphasizes that
incorrect legislative fact-finding and suspect legislative purposes do not
render a statute unconstitutional, as long as the legislature's stated ra-
tionale is legitimate. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz82
is even more striking. In Fritz, a congressional commission prepared
model legislation that undercut a stated purpose of Congress in its re-
form of the railroad retirement system. Although Congress was unaware
of this failing when it enacted the "model" legislation, the Court none-
theless upheld the law. Accepting post hoe justifications as "plausible
reasons" for the inequities created by the law,83 the Court found uncon-
vincing Justice Brennan's assertion that "[a] challenged classification
may be sustained only if it is rationally related to achievement of an ac-
tual legitimate governmental purpose." 84 The current court, bent on val-
78. 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (validating law requiring optometrist's prescriptions for opticians
to fit old glasses into new frames while exempting sellers of ready-to-wear glasses).
79. 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (approving ordinance allowing commercial entities to advertise
only on their own vehicles and disallowing the placement of identical ads on for-hire vehicles).
80. See generally Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and
Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1070-88 (1979) (arguing that so-called minimum ra-
tionality analysis has some bite); Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 20-21, 44-48 (1972) (criticizing mere
rationality as without necessary "bite" to ensure legislative deliberation); Linde, Due Process of Law-
making, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 197-222 (1976) (examining "rationality" as a premise for judicial
review).
81. 449 U.S. 456, 464, 469-70 (1981) (upholding "environmental" law prohibiting sale of milk
in plastic nonreturnable containers despite evidence both of intent to harm out-of-state producers
and of harmful environmental effects of legislation). For further discussion of the role of motive in
equal protection review, see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Cr. REV. 95 (criticizing failure of Court to recognize that legis-
lators sometimes do act out of illicit motivations); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) (arguing that while legislative motivation is cogniza-
ble, proof of illicit motive merely shifts burden to legislature to proffer a legitimate motive). But see
Linde, supra note 80, at 220-21 (legislative motive impossible to ascertain). See generally Sympo-
sium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 925 (1978).
82. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
83. Id. at 179; see id. at 178 (summarizing the inequity and giving possible reasons for it).
84. d at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In support of this proposition, Justice Brennan referred
to Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, in which the Court held that "in equal protection cases [the Court need
not] accept at face value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination ... demonstrates
that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation." Id. at 187 (quoting Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975)). Unlike Fritz which involved social and eco-
nomic legislation, Wiesenfeld invalidated a gender-specific provision of the Social Security Act. 420
U.S. at 653; see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 221 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding
that "respect for the legislative process precluded the assumption that ... statutory discrimination is
the product of... irrational lawmaking").
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idating legislative judgments, eschews the notion that Congress must
mean what it says.8 5
Why is there such a strong presumption of constitutionality? Com-
mentators have advanced two conflicting lines of reasoning, both of
which have found their way into Supreme Court decisionmaking. Under
one view, lawmakers seek to further some "social good" through their
enactments.8 6 As Professor Michelman describes the "social good"
model, the legislature is the "forum for identifying or defining [objec-
tives], and acting towards those ends. The process is one of mutual
search through joint deliberation .... Moral insight, sociological under-
standing, and goodwill are all legislative virtues." T87 the classic Supreme
Court statement on this point is Vance v. Bradley:88 "The Constitution
presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that
judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely
we may think a political branch has acted."8' 9
Court opinions that speak of Congress as a "deliberative" 90 body
and recognize that the "nature of the judicial process makes it an inap-
propriate forum for the determination of complex factual questions of the
kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication" 91 also conform to
this model. These opinions suggest that the legislature is the branch of
government constitutionally best equipped to establish social objectives
through law.92
85. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128
(1972) ("It is always possible to define the legislative purpose of a statute in such a way that the
statutory classification is rationally related to it.... The nature of the burdens or benefits created by
a statute and the nature of the chosen class's commonality will always suggest a statutory purpose
86. See generally Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1980);
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of
Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-1978).
87. Michelman, supra note 86, at 149.
88. 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (upholding mandatory retirement rules for Foreign Service employees).
89. Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
90. See, eg., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472-73, 490-91 (1980) (upholding minority
business set-aside provision enacted by Congress).
91. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (upholding Congress's power to lower the voting age in federal elections but rejecting
such power with respect to state elections).
92. Special deference is accorded to congressional judgments, even when fundamental rights or
suspect classifications are involved. See eg., Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 187-89 (1976)
(suspect class); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103
(1973) (fundamental rights). For example, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, Chief Justice Burger argued
that-even under strict scrutiny review-Congress was empowered to set aside for minority busi-
nesses 10 percent of a local public works act program. 448 U.S. at 492 (plurality opinion). In
reaching this conclusion, the Chief Justice blandly stated: "Although the Act recites no preambu-
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The second view depicts the legislative process as a battle of political
interest groups93 that culminates in a "public choice." 94 This view leads
Judge Posner to conclude that "it would be a mistake to require that
legislation... be reasonably related to some general social goal. The real
'justification' for most legislation is simply that it is the product of the
constitutionally created political process of our society." 95 Granted, the
Supreme Court's ostensible insistence on legitimate ends deviates from
this model.96 The Court's recognition that "due regard [should be ac-
corded to] the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to de-
cide,"' 97 however, smacks of the public choice model. Consequently,
once the Court finds that there are "plausible reasons for Congress' ac-
tion, [the Court's] inquiry is at an end." 98
The "social good" and "public choice" models involve presump-
tions, i.e., that the choices made serve socially important goals and that
the political process legitimizes the choices. The question whether the
Constitution establishes some minimum of fair procedures in lawmaking
is irrelevant to these formulations. Some commentators, most notably
Laurence Tribe and Hans Linde, have urged that attention be paid to the
lawmaking process. 99 Linde, in his seminal Due Process of Lawmaking
article, argues that the impossibility of ascertaining legislative intent1°°
necessitates the use of procedural safeguards as the sole means of ensur-
lary 'findings' on the subject, we are satisfied that Congress had abundant historical basis from which
it could conclude that traditional procurement practices ... could perpetuate the effects of prior
discrimination." Id. at 478 (emphasis added). Critical to this deferential stance is the Court's re-
gard for congressional action in this field. See eg., id. at 472-73, 490-91. For a quasi-critical look at
Fullilove, see Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987).
93. See generally T. Lows, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969).
94. This phrase is borrowed from Bice, supra note 86, at 19.
95. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial
Minorities, 1974 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 28-29; cf. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REv. 29 (1984) (arguing that heightened rationality is required for precisely this reason).
96. With respect to congressional enactments, this demand now appears to be merely pro
forma. In its recent Lyng v. UAW decision, the Court remarked: "We have stressed that this stan-
dard of review is typically quite deferential; legislative classifications are 'presumed to be valid,'
largely for the reason that 'the drawing of lines that create distinction is peculiarly a legislative task
and an unavoidable one.'" 108 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (1988) (citations omitted).
97. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
98. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
99. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1673-87 (2d ed. 1988); Linde, supra note 80,
at 199, 222-35; Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis of Ideology, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1972). But see
Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider," 134 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1291
(1986) (arguing that process and substance cannot be separated in a meaningful way).
100. According to Linde, "a law will push toward a goal only within the limits of objectives that
may or may not be apparent in retrospect. Legislative declarations and legislative history cannot be
relied on to reflect the actual balance of considerations that shaped the law." Linde, supra note 80,
at 220.
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ing legislative rationality.101 Tribe, in contrast, views the examination of
process as an additional judicial check on the legislative enterprise.10 2
Supreme Court decisions are not particularly helpful here. The
Court has demanded that Congress abide by its own rules in conducting
investigations,10 3 that the presence of a quorum and the vote required for
passage are essential to legislative validity, l °4 and that Congress must
abide by constitutional specifications in unseating members. 05 But the
Court has never come close to suggesting that Congress adopt proce-
dures to ensure due deliberation in lawmaking. Indeed, in Field v.
Clark, 0 6 the Court did not bat an eyelid when confronted with a piece of
legislation that-despite signatures by the President, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate-deviated from
the legislation actually passed by both Houses of Congress. While recog-
nizing that there is "no authority [to view] as a legislative act, any bill
not passed by Congress,"' 0 7 the Court without hesitation held that the
signatures of the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
constitute a "declaration" that a bill has received "the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government."' 10 8
This constrained view of judicial authority is at once sensible and
disconcerting. Take the case of the FY 88 continuing resolution: the
limitations on floor debate, the proliferation of amendments in confer-
ence, the all-or-nothing stakes of omnibus legislation, the threatened
shutdown of the government, and especially the denial to most Members
of Congress of access to the conferees' final work-product, all speak to
the need for the judiciary to take a "hard look" at this type of legisla-
tion.'0 9 In short, when only a handful of legislators exercise control over
101. See id. at 238-45; see also Van Alstyne, A Critical Look at Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 1, 20 (arguing that "acts of Congress might be judicially reviewable as to their procedural integ-
rity, but not as to their substance").
102. Tribe, supra note 99, at 83 ("[Ihe processes and rules that constitute the enterprise and
define the roles of its participants matter quite apart from any identifiable 'end state' that is ulti-
mately produced.").
103. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1949).
104. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1892).
105. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 54748 (1969); see also Linde, Comment on Powell v.
McCormack, 17 UCLA L. REV. 174 (1969).
106. 143 U.S. 649 (1892). A section of the enacted bill was omitted from the enrolled bill that
was authenticated by the appropriate signatures. Id at 668-69.
107. Id. at 669.
108. Id. at 672.
109. In administrative law, a court will occasionally overturn an agency decision if it "becomes
aware.., that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not
genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). The Supreme Court used this
approach in the "air bag" case, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983). Finding the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's rescission of its air bag re-
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the final version of a bill, judicial speculation about what Congress might
have thought seems a little far-fetched.
At the same time, heightened judicial review is an unsatisfactory
solution. Congress, whatever its faults, is the branch of government that
makes laws. To find in the Constitution some demand that the lawmak-
ing process operate either fairly or efficiently is to lay waste the basic
assumption of legislative reasonableness. Challenges concerning the
length of legislative debates or procedures governing legislative factflnd-
ing merely cloak the real battle over means/ends scrutiny. Presumptions
applied to validate legislative means/ends determinations must therefore
extend to the legislative process that defines means and ends.
Hans Linde suggests otherwise:
Of course, our lawmaking process is not about to become perfectly
responsible, perfectly accountable, perfectly democratic .... The
point is, rather, that the process everywhere is governed by rules, that
these rules are purposefully made and from time to time changed, and
that most of them are sufficiently concrete so that participants and ob-
servers alike will recognize when a legislative body is following the due
process of lawmaking and when it is not.... What the due process
clauses add to such rules is... a federal floor under law making [sic]
processes .... 111)
Linde's insistence that Congress conform to specific constitutional re-
quirements and internal rules seems quite reasonable."' 1 His notion that
due process limits internal House and Senate rules is more troublesome.
The FY 88 continuing resolution exemplifies this difficulty. Un-
doubtedly, the legislative process "broke down" with this enactment.
Although no internal rules were violated, the fact that legislators were
denied access to the final bill and other "irregularities" would presuma-
bly violate Linde's conception of due process.112
Nevertheless, there is good reason to retain the presumption of insti-
tutional capacity and not utilize due process to invalidate this legislation.
quirement "arbitrary and capricious," the Court concluded that an agency must supply a reasoned
analysis before rescinding a rule. Id. at 46, 57. For a defense of this doctrine, see Sunstein, In
Defense of the Hard Look" Judicial Activism and Administrative Law, 7 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
51 (1984); cf Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984) (broad deference accorded to agency rulemaking, including recognition of propriety of politi-
cally influenced rulemaking). For a defense of executive enforcement discretion, see Rabkin &
Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settle-
ments with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REv. 203, 237-42 (1987).
110. Linde, supra note 80, at 242, 245.
111. There are even problems here, however. Because the Senate Majority Leader can effectively
waive all rules through a unanimous consent motion, an argument can be made that courts should be
circumspect in this area.
112. Linde, of course, would insist that, as a prerequisite to litigant standing, there be some
alleged injury to "life, liberty or property." Linde, supra note 80, at 245.
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First, there is the notion-a notion that in part underlies minimal ration-
ality analysis-that Congress will fix that which is broken. 113 Presuma-
bly, bad features of legislation will be repealed and bad procedures will
be amended. Events subsequent to the enactment of the FY 88 continu-
ing resolution lend credence to this premise. Some offensive portions of
the statute have been repealed1 14 and a serious effort is afoot to prevent
future debacles. 115
Second, drawing a principled line between necessary safeguards and
desirable practices seems impossible. For example, do rules limiting de-
bate and amendment violate due process? What about ideologically
skewed witness lists at hearings? What about legislation that does not
originate in committee? The answers to these questions are value-laden.
Due process in lawmaking therefore is only as sensible as active judicial
review of all legislative decisionmaking.
In the end, we are left with the sinking feeling that legislative con-
trol over lawmaking means legislative control over both good and bad
lawmaking. While the FY 88 continuing resolution approaches lawmak-
ing that "shocks the conscience," 116 Congress seems the branch of gov-
ernment best equipped to correct this deficiency. Aside from insisting
that Congress conform to explicit constitutional mandates and its own
procedures, the judicial role in the lawmaking process should be de
minimis.
III. THE PRESIDENT'S VETO
The veto power that the Constitution gives the President is limited
to discrete enactments, not portions of a bill.1 17 Common sense suggests
that this power is threatened by omnibus legislation. By parlaying sev-
eral separate bills and a host of limitation riders into a single "bill," Con-
gress presumably shields its decisionmaking from the Executive's
scrutiny. Supporters of the item veto and critics of omnibus legislation
portray the current state of affairs as a legislative power grab that is fun-
damentally inconsistent both with Congress's obligation to enact single-
subject legislation and with the President's veto. 18 Their argument finds
little support in the text of the Constitution, the historic uses of the veto,
113. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 16.
115. See supra notes 3, 18 and accompanying text.
116. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
117. The Constitution provides: "Every Bill... before it becomes a law [shall] be presented to
the President of the United States; If he approves he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it." U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
118. See generally Line-Item Veto: Hearing on S.J. Res. 26, S.J. Res. 178, and S. 1921 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1984)
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or President Reagan's use of the veto power in the face of omnibus
legislation.
A. Omnibus Legislation and the Constitution.
Article I, section 7 simply provides that every bill "shall have passed
the House of Representatives and the Senate" and shall be "presented to
the President" before it becomes law. It is preposterous to suggest that
omnibus legislation runs afoul of this requirement. The words "every
bill" in the presentment clause cannot be read to refer solely to single-
subject enactments. 119 Article I, section 7 specifies a process: bills must
pass both chambers and be presented to the President. If the process
takes place, presentment concerns are satisfied, irrespective of how much
or how little the bill contains.
Furthermore, article I, section 5 grants each House the power to
"determine the rules of the proceedings." This power presumably in-
cludes the authority to define the germaneness of legislative provisions.
Consequently, as Professor Tribe suggests, "the President may wield his
veto on the legislative product only in the form in which Congress
chooses to send it to the White House: be the bill small or large, its
concerns focused or diffuse, the form particular or omnibus, the Presi-
dent must accept or reject the entire thing, swallowing the bitter with the
sweet."120
All of this may sound rather obvious. Nevertheless, contentious de-
bate has emerged on this question. 12' Critics of the current practice ar-
gue that "a 'bill,' in the constitutional sense should be held to be an
(statement of Sen. Hatch (quoting President Eisenhower)); id. at 42 (statement of Sen. Mattingly);
Best, The Item Veto: Would the Founders Approve?, 14 PRES. STuD. Q. 183, 187 (1984).
119. In litigation between Rupert Murdoch (News America) and the Federal Communications
Commission, the FY 88 continuing resolution had been challenged on precisely these grounds. At-
torneys for Murdoch characterized the continuing resolution as "an all-or-nothing omnibus appro-
priations package that reduced the President's veto power to a nullity" and violated the presentment
clause. Brief for Appellant at 48, 49, News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1037). Murdoch therefore argued that provisions in the continuing resolution
that prohibit the cross-ownership of a television station and newspaper in the same market are un-
constitutional. For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 156-90 and accompanying text.
Murdoch's "presentment clause" argument is without merit. The Constitution only guarantees the
]'resident a right to veto legislation. It does not demand that Congress present legislation to him in a
form that makes him feel comfortable with his exercise of the veto. See infra note 120 and accompa-
nying text.
120. L. TRIBE, supra note 99, at 265.
121. See, eg., Line Item Veto: Hearings on S. 43 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Admin-
istration, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1985) [hereinafter S. 43 Hearings] (statement of Johnny Killian)
("[W]hen the framers drew up the veto clause, they assumed the word 'bill' meant a legislative
instrument setting forth one or more propositions of law, all related, however, to a single subject
matter."); Best, supra note 118; Givens; The Validity of a Separate Veto of Nongermane Riders to
Legislation, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 60, 62 (1965).
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interconnected piece of legislation concerned with one or more related
subjects." 122 This position is based on a combination of intuition and the
improbability of the Framers foreseeing such modern creations of omni-
bus legislation and limitation riders.123
The argument behind the position proves unsatisfactory on at least
two counts. First, even if the Framers did not foresee omnibus legisla-
tion, the same cannot be said of congressional control over the legislative
process or the limitation of the veto power to an up-or-down decision by
the President. Second, as demonstrated by Louis Fisher1 24 and others, 125
"we have had omnibus bills from the start."1 26 In fact, the first three
appropriations bills passed by Congress were omnibus measures.1 27
Judicially requiring single-subject bills, moreover, is impracticable.
It asks the courts to undertake an unmanagable task; determining the
relatedness of bill provisions seems particularly within the domain of the
legislature. For example, environmental and trade legislation, while con-
cerning different subject areas, may affect the same industry; a reviewing
court would be hard-pressed to determine whether the relatedness re-
quirement is met by legislation that addresses both of these subject areas.
More significantly, legislation is frequently the by-product of compro-
mise. Superimposing a relatedness requirement would severely disrupt
existing legislative practices.
The critics would be no better served by a mathematical device,
such as limiting bill length or the number of amendments. How many
amendments, for example, are "too many?" One? Four? One thousand?
The bottom line is that for constitutional purposes a bill "denotes a sin-
gular piece of legislation in the form in which it was approved by
Congress." 1 28
B. The Purposes of the Veto Power.
Omnibus legislation might also run afoul of the Constitution by dis-
placing the President's veto power. The contours of the veto power are
122. Givens, supra note 121, at 62; see Gressman, Is the Item Veto Constitutional?, 64 N.C.L.
REV. 819, 921 (1986) ("ITihe decision whether to adopt and then present one of 300 bills is a matter
of legislative choice."); Note, Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE L.J. 838, 840 n. 11
(1987).
123. See S. 43 Hearings, supra note 121, at 19; Best, supra note 118, at 187.
124. See S. 43 Hearings, supra note 121, at 192 (statement of Louis Fisher); Fisher, supra note
16, at 25-26.
125. See, e.g., Note, supra note 122, at 840-43.
126. 5. 43 Hearings, supra note 121, at 192.
127. See Fisher, supra note 16, at 25-26. Because several of the Framers served in the First
Congress, this historical evidence is especially probative.
128. L. TRIBE, supra note 99, at 266.
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difficult to glean from the Constitution. Article I, section 7 only tells us
that if the President "approves" of legislation "he shall sign it, but if not
he shall return it." The Constitution does not specify whether the Presi-
dent may appropriately exercise this power whenever he disagrees with a
legislative judgment, or only in matters of significant constitutional
dimension.
The presentment clause and pocket veto provisions provide some
guidance on this point. These provisions reveal that at the very least the
veto power encompasses the right to review congressional action that is
"legislative in effect."' 129 The pocket veto specifically provides that Con-
gress cannot nullify the veto by preventing the President's return of legis-
lation through adjournment. 130 In a similar vein, the presentment
clause-as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service v. Chadha 131-preserves the President's veto:
[T]he President's veto, and Congress' power to override a veto were
intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the
people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating certain
prescribed steps. To preserve those checks, and maintain the separa-
tion of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each
Branch must not be eroded.' 32
To say that the President shall have "suitable opportunity to con-
sider" 133 congressional decisionmaking is not to say much. Is this power
limited to decisionmaking that curtails constitutionally designated execu-
tive functions? What then of legislation that the President finds clearly
unconstitutional? Finally, what of legislation that is merely inconsistent
with the President's policy views? The Supreme Court has not devoted
much attention to this matter, but its decisions suggest that the veto
power extends to all three categories of cases. In Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Court described the President's lawmaking pow-
ers as encompassing "the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the
129. See S. REp. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897), discussed in L. FISHER, supra note 33,
at 162-64.
130. Under article I, the President is obligated to return unsatisfactory laws to Congress within
10 days. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The bill, however, does not become law if "the Congress by
their Adjournment prevent its return." Id. Instead, the bill is a nullity. Rather than override the
President's inaction, Congress must repass the legislation. The "pocket veto" has generated substan-
tial litigation and commentary. See generally L. FISHER, supra note 33, at 150-54; (1985); Kennedy,
Congress, the President, and the Pocket Veto, 63 VA. L. REV. 335 (1977); McGowan, The President's
Veto Power: An Important Instrument of Conflict in Our Constitutional System, 23 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 791, 817-20 (1986).
131. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
132. Id. at 957-58; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) ("The principle of separa-
tion of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven
into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.").
133. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 596 (1938).
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vetoing of laws he thinks bad."1 34 More recently, in Chadha, the Court
proclaimed that "[t]he President's role in the lawmaking process also re-
flects the Framer's careful efforts to check whatever propensity a particu-
lar Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered
measures. "135
This broad understanding is not universally shared. Most notably,
Professor Charles Black has argued that the "original understanding
[was] that the veto would be used only rarely" and used mainly to defend
either the Presidency itself or the Constitution.1 36 Otherwise, Professor
Black-pointing to the difficulty of legislative overrides of presidential
vetoes 137-feels that the veto will be transformed into a "means of sys-
tematic policy control [by the President] over the legislative branch."138
The language and historical uses of the veto, however, run contrary to
Professor Black's interpretation.
The Constitution does not limit the veto power to certain categories
of presidential objections. Instead, the Constitution only obligates the
President to sign those bills that he "approves." Indeed, the perception
that the President would use the veto to oppose laws on policy grounds
led to the Framers' adoption of a qualified veto (subject to a
supermajority override) rather than an absolute veto.13 9 This under-
standing is exemplified by statements by James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton. Madison claimed that the veto existed "to restrain the legisla-
ture from encroaching on the other co-ordinate Departments, or on the
rights of the people at large; or from passing laws unwise in their princi-
ple, or incorrect in their form."' 4 Hamilton similarly characterized the
veto as "an additional security against the enaction of improper laws." 14'
This broad view of the veto power gains additional support from the
historical record. Presidents Washington and Madison both vetoed legis-
lation that they simply found unsatisfactory. 142 The early prevalence of
134. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (emphasis added).
135. 462 U.S. at 947-48 (emphasis added).
136. Black, Some Thoughts on the Veto, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 87, 90. In a
similar vein, Justice White argued in Buckley v. Valeo that "the major purpose of the veto power
appears to have been to shore up the Executive Branch and to provide it with some bargaining and
survival power against what the Framers feared would be the overweening power of legislators."
424 U.S. 1, 285 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. Black, supra note 136, at 92-94.
138. Id. at 90.
139. See McGowan, supra note 130, at 794-96.
140. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 586 (1937);
see l1id. at 139.
141. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 375-76 (A. Hamilton) (M. Beloff ed. 1987).
142. See L. FISHER, supra note 33, at 144-45. Professor Black, however, characterizes these
early vetoes as bearing some connection to essential executive functions. Black, supra note 136, at
90-91. I find Louis Fisher's depiction more persuasive. More significantly, the disagreement be-
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policy-based vetoes is exemplified by John Tyler, who exercised his veto
power so often that a frustrated Congress charged him "with the high
crime and misdemeanor of withholding his assent to laws... which in-
volved no constitutional difficulty on his part." 143 This charge, however,
was mere symbolism. The policy-based veto was already well-accepted.
Just as Congress is free to determine the contours of "a bill," the
President is unrestrained in his ability to veto such bills. While the crim-
inal abuse of this power might constitute an impeachable offense, Con-
gress must generally resort to its override power or the political process if
it wants to curb the presidential veto.
This state of affairs is not at all troublesome. The veto power checks
legislative excess; the veto override checks executive excess. 144 A mean-
ingful veto prevents Congress from using its power to determine enforce-
ment goals and enforcement mechanisms through legislation 145 to place
the Executive at peril. On the other hand, Congress's power to make
laws and override vetoes preserves legislative supremacy in lawmaking.
The veto power should function as a moderating device, preserving the
independence of each branch and encouraging effective lawmaking. It
should also encourage dialogue and cooperation between Congress and
the Executive; presumably neither branch wants a veto controversy
either to precipitate conflict with the other or to undermine its version of
the public good.
The existing system, of course, does not yield a perfect equipoise
between executive and legislative power. The President's use of the veto
power is potentially unwieldy, since Congress (through 1980) has over-
tween Fisher and Black points to the malleability of the Black test. The determination of what bears
a nexus to core executive functions is an open invitation to a value-based sliding-scale inquiry. For
further criticism of Black, see L. FISHER, supra note 33, at 14243; McGowan, supra note 130, at
803. Indeed, if Black's notion of core executive functions is extended to the concept of preserving a
balance of power between the President and Congress, his underlying concern with the aggrandize-
ment of executive power may be satisfied by the occasional use of the policy veto. See generally
Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 467, 515 (1962) ("[The
veto] functions to preserve and strengthen that equilibrium of power between the branches which lies
at the heart of the separation of powers principle."); Zinn, The Veto Power of the President, 12
F.R.D. 207, 212-13 (1952) ("[The veto] is his most potent weapon .... It was given to him to enable
him to protect himself from the encroachment of the legislature.").
143. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 144 (1843).
144. This is Alexander Hamilton's vision of the veto. As described by Judge McGowan:
Alexander Hamilton... [defended] the veto by arguing that the veto also served the salu-
tary purpose of preventing unwise laws. The President could use the veto to block laws
precipitously enacted in the heat of factionalism. The people would be protected against
abuse of this power because the President would rarely hazard a test of power with the
Congress if not backed by the popular will. This was especially so when the veto could be
overriden by the Congress. When the President vetoes an act, he risks public political
rejection by Congress.
McGowan, supra note 130, at 797.
145. See Rabkin & Devins, supra note 109, at 234-42.
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ridden less than seven percent of vetoes. 146 In the early 1970s, this pros-
pect led commentators to bemoan the "Imperial Presidency" 147 when
Presidents Nixon and Ford used the veto power and the impoundment
device to frustrate congressional initiatives. 148 On the other side, several
political scientists have concluded that it is too costly for the President to
veto major legislation.14 9 Clinton Rossiter, for example, suggests that
The President often feels compelled to sign bills that are full of dubious
grants and subsidies rather than risk a breakdown in the work of whole
departments. While it salves his conscience and cools his anger to an-
nounce publicly that he would veto these if he could, most Congress-
men have learned to pay no attention to his protests. 150
While each of these competing views is supported by ample evidence, I
suspect that the truth lies somewhere in the middle: the President vetoes
legislation that he finds sufficiently offensive to justify the political price
tag associated with a veto; Congress overrides vetoes when it finds its
enactment sufficiently compelling to justify to pay the political price tag
associated with an override (which usually requires some members of the
President's party to vote against him). This formulation seems some-
what of a tautology, for it presumes that the President and Congress have
sufficient free will to protect their independence through their respective
use of the veto and veto overrides.
C. The Veto and Omnibus Legislation.
Omnibus legislation allegedly disturbs this delicate balance. Omni-
bus bills have been labeled veto-proof: by conglomerating legislative of-
ferings in a single measure and then presenting this package to the
President one day before the end of an appropriations cycle, Congress
supposedly can make the veto power too painful to exercise. 151 Con-
146. See L. FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 30 (2d ed. 1987); PRESIDENTIAL VE-
TOES, 1789-1976, at ix (1978) (compiled by Senate Library).
147. See, eg., A. SCHLESSINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
148. Ford administration vetoes are discussed in Black, supra note 136, and Ressen, The Arro-
gant Veto, NATION, Aug. 30, 1975, at 133-37. The Nixon impoundment controversy is comprehen-
sively discussed in L. FISHER, supra note 1, at 147-201. See also Abscal & Kramer, Presidential
Impoundment Part 1. Historical Genesis and Constitutional Framework, 62 GEO. L.J. 1549 (1974).
149. See generally Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REv. 403
(1988). Through 1980, Presidents have vetoed less than three percent of the bills presented to them.
Copeland, When Congress and the President Collide: Why Presidents Veto Legislation, 45 J. POL.
696, 697 (1983).
150. C. RosSrrER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 254 (1956).
151. Correlatively, a movement is afoot among those who believe in an effective veto either to
enact legislation or to amend the Constitution to provide the Executive with item-veto authority.
The item veto is a horrendous idea. As Louis Fisher and I have discussed elsewhere, the item veto,
among other failings, threatens the original design of legislation (whether it be single or multi-sub-
ject) and undermines congressional control over the lawmaking process. See Fisher & Devins, How,
Successfully Can the States'Item Veto Be Transferred to the President?, 75 GEO. LJ. 159 (1986). In
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gress, of course, cannot legislate away the veto power. At the same time,
nothing in the text of the Constitution mandates that the President's ex-
ercise of the veto power be palatable. As long as it is properly presented
to the President, omnibus legislation, as "bills" subject to the President's
veto, satisfies article I, section 7's literal requirements. The question re-
mains, however, whether omnibus continuing resolutions violate the
spirit of the Constitution.
The answer is no. Although omnibus legislation changes the nature
of the exchange between the White House and Congress, the veto still
functions as a mediating device. For example, with respect to the FY 88
continuing resolution, the White House and Congress undertook exten-
sive negotiations to ensure that the bill was satisfactory to both sides. 152
In the end, Congress abandoned the fairness doctrine and included Con-
tra aid to stave off a threatened veto. 153 If anything, such legislative
compromises reveal that a President who is willing to use his veto wields
enormous power in such negotiations.1 54 At the same time, legislative
control over the lawmaking process is not undermined by omnibus meas-
ures, since only Congress can decide to enact a megabill.
To say that omnibus legislation is consistent with the veto power
and the policies that underlie it is not to say that veto power concerns
a recent article, Professor Glen Robinson argues that the item veto is a worthwhile experiment
because a host of disincentives limit the effective exercise of the veto power. In particular Robinson
is concerned that "public good" legislation "encumbered" by "private good" pork projects will not
be vetoed because of the valuable "public" features of such legislation. Robinson, supra note 149, at
410-11; see also Clineburg, The Presidential Veto Power, 18 S.C.L. REv. 732, 737 (1966) (Veto
power, in part, is designed for the President's "use against legislation that would serve provincial
interests at the expense of the national interest."). This view presupposes that the President is better
equipped than Congress to ascertain the national interest and that the costs of undermining legisla-
tive compromise are worthwhile. Robinson, moreover, makes the curious argument that the item
veto will not aggrandize executive power because practical constraints will limit the President's use
of the item veto. Robinson, supra note 149, at 417, 418; see also Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of
Public Choice-Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 172 (1988) (Pork-barrel projects allow "even the
poorest regions of America to feel that they can get to the table where goodies are distributed" which
lessens "regional resentment and suspicion of the national legislature.").
152. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
154. Despite his protestation, President Reagan has been well served by omnibus legislation.
Aside from his effective use of the veto threat in the FY 88 continuing resolution, President Reagan's
principal legislation initiative-the 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act-was a megabill of the first
order. As Louis Fisher notes:
The size of the bill did not offend him at all. Instead, the complaints came from legislators
who were forced to act within a short time on a bill no one could possibly grasp. More
than 250 members worked in 58 sub-conferences to produce the measure. Programs were
cut without hearings and with little time for floor debate or amendment. The reconcilia-
tion bill became a freight train, racing through at high speeds, subject only to an up-or-
down vote. The omnibus nature of the bill was championed by the White House and
presidential supporters as the only way to make cuts in popular programs.
Fisher, supra note 43, at 103.
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would not be better served by narrower legislation. Because it contains a
host of measures that otherwise would function as independent enact-
ments, omnibus legislation is necessarily high-stakes legislation. The
stakes make Congress and the President willing to make concessions that
they would not ordinarily make on single-subject bills. In FY 88, for
example, both sides compromised to ensure enactment. Although it is
often sensible to compromise, omnibus legislation limits the opportunity
both for Congress to push its legislative agenda forward (since it will
make concessions to avoid a veto) and for the President to check legisla-
tive excess (since he too will compromise to avoid having to use his veto).
Although the changing function of the veto in an era of megabills is a
phenomenon worthy of careful study, the altered process does not neces-
sarily yield a deficient legislative work-product.
IV. THE OBLIGATION TO ABIDE BY THE CONSTITUTION REVISITED:
RUPERT MURDOCH VS. THE FCC
In my earlier article, I spoke briefly of instances when Congress-
through the appropriations process-has enacted legislation that directed
the Executive to act in a manner forbidden by the Constitution. 155 In
litigation involving the 1988 continuing resolution, News America Pub-
lishing, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 15 6 the limited dura-
tion of appropriations measures and the problems of legislative intent
surrounding continuing resolutions combined to underscore the constitu-
tional problems with achieving policy objectives through the appropria-
tions process.
News America involved the constitutionality of a limitation rider
that prohibited the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from
"extend[ing] the time period of current grants of temporary waivers" of
Commission regulations prohibiting the co-ownership of a television sta-
tion and newspaper in the same market.1 57 The only "current grants of
155. Devins, supra note 6, at 474-75.
156. 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
157. Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-32 (1987). News America also challenged a limitation
rider prohibiting the FCC from reconsidering its cross-ownership prohibition. Brief for Appellant at
37-45, News America (No. 88-1037). In FCC v. National Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting, how-
ever, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this FCC regulation. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
In distinguishing National Citizen's Comm., News America claimed that the availability of waiv-
ers-undermined here by the "no extension" language-was a critical element of the Court's hold-
ing. See Brief for Appellant at 39. The correctness of this claim is irrelevant to the case at hand.
First, the freeze on the cross-ownership prohibition is only relevant insofar as the FCC is also pro-
hibited from extending the News America waiver. Consequently, the validity of the "no extension"
language remains the critical question. Second, since limitation riders are best understood as single-
year appropriations measures, the underlying FCC regulation upheld by the Supreme Court remains
intact. See Devins, supra note 6, at 461-62. The FCC made this point claiming that, "[i]n essence,
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temporary waivers" apply to the New York Post and Boston Herald, both
owned by Rupert Murdoch. Murdoch's publishing firm (News America)
claimed that this provision violated the equal protection guarantee and
amounted to a bill of attainder.158 The D.C. Circuit agreed with Mur-
doch's claim that the "no extensions" rider was too limited in effect and
struck down the provision.159
The prohibition against bills of attainder reflects "the Framers' be-
lief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as [the judiciary] to
the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate
punishment upon, specific persons." 16 As a result, congressional acts
that punish an identifiable person or persons are unconstitutional. Pun-
ishment, however, is not the mere imposition of "burdensome conse-
quences."' 161  Rather, punishment comprises historical statutory
punishment, penalties that evince malicious legislative intent, or burdens
that are simply too severe to be consistent with nonpunitive legislative
purposes.162
Congress has codified the Commission's rule by locking it into place, in its statute, until September
30, 1988." Corrected Brief for the Federal Communications Commission at 15, News America (No.
88-1037).
158. Murdoch also argued that the continuing resolution violated: (1) the first amendment be-
cause it was motivated by a desire to censor News America's views, Brief for Appellant at 19-22, and
(2) the FCC's right to control the manner in which it administers its responsibilities, id at 27-30. As
to the second argument, the FCC-by viewing the "no extension" language as a legislative "ban on
the extension of temporary waivers"-characterized the rider as a substantive amendment within
Congress's lawmaking power. Corrected Brief for the Federal Communications Commission at 43.
The FCC argued, however, that the "no extension" language cannot stand as a temporary re-
straining measure, for that "kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws ... is
constitutionally impermissible." Id at 45 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986)).
The FCC and News America were clearly incorrect on this point. Appropriations are as much acts
of Congress as are authorizations. Congress is therefore unencumbered in its ability to set policy
through appropriations. See Devins, supra note 6, at 471-74. Recent separation of powers decisions,
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (presentment/veto); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)
(appointment/removal); Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (appointment/removal), are not
to the contrary. All of these cases involved the displacement of core executive power. The "no
extension" rule, on the other hand, is the simple exercise of Congress's power over the purse.
159. News America, 844 F.2d at 815.
160. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445 (1965) (law barring Communist party members
from offices in labor unions violates bill of attainder prohibition). Bills of attainder are prohibited by
article I, section 9, clause 3 of the Constitution because they deprive the person or persons singled
out for punishment of the safeguards of a trial by jury.
161. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977). In this case, the Supreme
Court upheld provisions of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 note (1982) (current version), that specifically required former President Nixon to cede con-
trol of his papers. In holding that Mr. Nixon was not "punished]" by this law, the Court noted that
the Act provided for just compensation. 433 U.S. at 475. For further discussion, see infra note 171.
162. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 851 (1984)
(rejecting bill of attainder challenge to statute denying federal financial aid to male students who
failed to register for the draft).
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The equal protection guarantee likewise protects against overly nar-
row classifications and improper motives. Equality demands that likes be
treated alike. Governmental action that affects only a narrow class is
problematic; it may unnecessarily impose burdens or extend benefits. As
Justice Jackson recognized in Railway Express v. New York: 163
[N]othing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow
... officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus escape the political retribution that might be
vested upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no
better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws
be equal in operation. 164
Traditional equal protection analysis, however, pays little attention
to these concerns. Unless illegitimate purpose is shown, the presumption
of legislative reasonableness empowers lawmakers to cast a narrow net.
Yet, when a fundamental right (such as speech) is involved, specificity
concerns loom much larger. In these fundamental rights equal protec-
tion cases, traditional deference is not accorded; instead, government
must demonstrate the reasonableness of its actions.165
Appropriations are a likely target for specificity-based challenges. 166
The single-year nature of appropriations narrows such measures' affected
field and thereby suggests pernicious legislative intent, especially when a
bill works to the disadvantage of an identifiable group. The "no exten-
sions" rider at issue in News America illustrates the thin line that sepa-
rates "legitimate" policy-based riders from unconstitutional government
action.
Specificity proved to be the critical concern in News America. Mur-
doch made the common sense argument that because Congress knew he
was the only "current recipient" to whom a temporary waiver could be
extended, the "no extensions" language was written with him in mind. 167
According to Murdoch, "[i]f the draftsmen had intended to encompass
any newspaper owner other than News America ... they would have
deleted the word 'current' or inserted the word 'future' in the continuing
resolution."' 168 The FCC responded that Congress's "current recipient"
limitation is irrelevant, because the continuing resolution's limited life
163. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
164. Id. at 112-13 (Jackson, J., concurring).
165. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987); Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
166. For example, with respect to bills of attainder, in United States v. Lovett, the Court struck
down legislation prohibiting the use of federal funds for salaries of named federal employees accused
of engaging in "subversive activity." 328 U.S. 303, 308 (1946).
167. Brief for Appellant at 20-21, News America (No. 88-1037).
168. Reply Brief for Appellant at 8, News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1037).
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cycle makes it imposssible to grant extensions to entities that have not
already received a temporary waiver.1 69 Because Congress is concerned
with the use of temporary waivers to frustrate the cross-ownership prohi-
bition, 170 the FCC argued, Murdoch is a "legitimate class of one."''
The FCC's and News America's arguments both misconstrued the
"typical" and "atypical" aspects of appropriations. News America un-
dermined its case because, as the FCC recognized, News America's ver-
sion of acceptable "general" language would have the same impact as the
challenged provision. News America thus neglected to consider the
"atypical" aspect of appropriations, i.e., their one-year duration. The
FCC, on the other hand, erred in failing to consider the "typical" aspect
of appropriations, i.e., that appropriations are statutes. The fact that the
continuing resolution expired on September 30, 1988, does not mean that
Congress could not have enacted general legislation prohibiting consecu-
tive temporary waivers. Instead, by enacting a statute of limited dura-
tion, Congress chose a legislative device whose impact could only be felt
by a single entity. The failings of FCC and News America both point to
the same conclusion, however: the "no extensions" provision triggers the
specificity concern associated with bills of attainder and fundamental-
rights-type equal protection.
The decision in News America is sensitive to these concerns. Em-
phasizing that "only" News America could not "seek an extension dur-
ing the fiscal year,"' 172 the D.C. Circuit concluded that the no extensions
rider poorly served Congress's purported goal of preserving the cross-
ownership prohibition. Since any other entity remained eligible for a
temporary extension, the court found the rider grossly underinclusive17 3
To protect the cross-ownership rule, the FCC should treat initial grants
of temporary extensions and extension renewals alike.
The court undertook this demanding means/ends analysis because
169. Corrected Brief for the Federal Communications Commission at 34-35.
170. Id. at 31.
171. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977). In Nixon, the Court
concluded that it was appropriate for the legislation to address only Mr. Nixon's record because
when the law was enacted, "only his materials demanded immediate attention." Id The Act did,
however, establish a special commission to recommend legislation for the preservation of future
Presidents' records. This "wider net" ostensibly convinced the Court that the legislation was of a
general character. Id
172. News America, 844 F.2d at 814.
173. As the News America court put it, "every publisher in the country other than Murdoch can
knock on the FCC's door and seek the exercise of its discretion to secure... a period of exemption
from the cross-ownership restrictions." Id Yet, since a temporary waiver could only be available to
Murdoch, no other publisher was "similarly situated" to News America during the rider's life cycle.
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fundamental speech rights were involved in the case.174 If heightened
review were not triggered, the rider would have survived traditional
equal protection review. As the News America dissent pointed out: "If
the aim is to preserve the cross-ownership rule, and waiver extensions
endanger the rule, then a prohibition on [current] extensions ... does
serve the purpose."175
News America's importance therefore should not be overstated. At-
tention must also be paid to whether Congress's motivations were imper-
missible, a critical element of both bill of attainder 76 and traditional
equal protection review. 177 Equal protection clause cases, however,
demonstrate that proof of discriminatory intent is extremely difficult.178
174. See id. at 810-14. But cf id at 816-23 (Robinson, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's
overextension of first amendment as applied to broadcast media).
175. Id. at 820.
176. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984)
(quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 475-76 (1977)). If legislation "falls
within the historical meaning of legislative punishment," it too will be struck down as an unconstitu-
tional bill of attainder. Id. Legislative punishment comprises imprisonment, banishment, punitive
confiscation of property, and legislative bars to employment. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474-75. Murdoch
claimed that "[t]he Continuing Resolution has, in effect, imposed a multi-million dollar fine upon
News America by reducing its ability to sell the New York Post at a reasonable price." Brief for
Appellant at 26 n.7, News America (No. 88-1037). Claiming that there is no right to an administra-
tive hearing, the FCC argued that Congress has plenary authority to eliminate a procedural ability to
seek extensions of waivers, and that any such congressional actions do not violate the bill of attain-
der prohibition. Corrected Brief for the Federal Communications Commission at 38-39. The FCC
has the better argument. Laws that cause economic disadvantage are not necessarily legislative pun-
ishment, for the bill of attainder clause "does not... limit[ ] Congress to the choice of legislating for
the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at all." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471.
The "reasonableness" inquiry also limits bill of attainder actions. "Reasonableness" means that
there are "legitimate justifications for passage of the Act." Id. at 476. The fact that more general
legislation could have been crafted is irrelevant. In Nixon, the Court did not find the legislation's
uncertain impact on future Presidents problematic. See supra note 171. Here, the fact that the "no
extensions" measure can oniy apply to Murdoch does not necessarily mean that it is punitive. With
respect to repeated temporary extensions undermining the cross-ownership prohibition, Murdoch-
for the time being-is a class of one. Congress's concern over the cross-ownership rule is also re-
flected in its general prohibition of FCC reconsideration of the rule. See supra note 157. Finally,
although bill of attainder concerns are heightened when Congress legislates through the appropria-
tions process, the difficulty of enacting more general substantive legislation may be a partial explana-
tion for this phenomenon. See generally Devins, supra note 6, at 464.
177. Traditional equal protection review makes the minimalist demand that social and economic
legislation further a less legitimate governmental purpose. See, eg., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985).
178. See, eg., McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3199 (1987) (limiting statistical proof of discrimi-
natory intent); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (" 'Discriminatory purpose'...
implies that the decisionmaker [selected] or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effect upon an identifiable group."); Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) ("[Tlhere is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to
invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters.") The proof of intent inquiry in bill of
attainder cases parallels this approach. See infra note 189.
APPROPRIATIONS REDUX
These proof problems were exacerbated in the News America situa-
tion, in which the "no extensions" rider was an eleventh-hour addition to
the omnibus continuing resolution. Indeed, Congress did not formally
discuss provision, and the conference report accompanying the continu-
ing resolution fails to address the provision's underlying rationale. The
legislative record reveals only that the "no extensions" rider was inserted
in conference. In fact, strong evidence suggests that most of the confer-
ees were unaware of the rider. 179
If the provision were merely a secret amendment, the intent analysis
would be fairly straightforward: because the insertion of amendments in
conference is part and parcel of the legislative process,' 80 the "no exten-
sions" amendment, if it is reasonably subject to a nonpunitive interpreta-
tion, is nonpunitive. This formulation ig not particularly appealing,
however, because it renders intent analysis a nullity when Congress, fol-
lowing internal procedures, does not create a legislative record. But in-
tent cannot be created out of thin air. Continuing resolutions, which
often contain secretly inserted amendments, thus can undermine mean-
ingful intent inquiry.
Newspaper interviews by the admitted sponsors of the amendment
and post-enactment statements on the Senate floor complicate the intent
inquiry in News America. 81 These statements reveal clear animosity to-
ward Murdoch by, among others, the amendment's chief architects, Er-
nest Hollings and Edward Kennedy.' 82 Hollings spoke of "this sneaky
operation of Rupert Murdoch"' 18 3 and Kennedy claimed that the rider
would ensure "that [Murdoch] wasn't going to be able to abuse the pro-
cess anymore."' 84 On the other hand, Kennedy characterized the rider
as a neutral measure designed to prevent anyone from evading the cross-
ownership rule by "obtaining a permanent exemption in the guise of a
series of temporary waivers."' 185
179. See Jones, Hollings Says He Originated Murdoch Curb, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1988, at 33, col.
5.
180. News America, noting the "highly irregular manner in which the Continuing Resolution
was enacted," argued that the bill should be invalidated on due process grounds. Brief for Appellant
at 21, 45-49. Yet, when there is technical compliance with internal legislative procedures, concerns
with due process in lawmaking are not triggered. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
181. See generally 134 CoNG. REc. S138-47 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1988); 134 CONr. REc. S54-69
(daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988); Brief foe" Appellant at A30-A70 (compendium of newspaper articles dis-
cussing cross-ownership riders).
182. Kennedy and Hollings have both admitted their role in crafting the "no extensions" rider.
See Jones, supra note 179; Kurkjian, Kennedy Defends Move on FCC Rule, Boston Globe, Jan. 4,
1988, at 42, col. 2.
183. 134 CONG. REc. S59 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Hollings).
184. Williams, Jerry Williams, Sen. Kennedy Clash on Radio, Boston Herald, Jan. 8, 1988, at 59,
col. 1.
185. 134 CONG. REC. S59 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
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Determining these statements' significance is problematic. 186 First,
the Supreme Court has frequently stated that it is "normally hesitant to
attach much weight to comments made after the passage of legisla-
tion."187 In the News America situation, however, the comments were
made by the rider's sponsors only a month after the rider's passage 88
and are the only available evidence of legislative intent. Second, even if
considered probative, isolated hostile statements "do not constitute 'the
unmistakable evidence of punitive intent which ... is required before a
congressional enactment of this kind may be struck down' [under the bill
of attainder clause]." 189 In view of some of the statements of nonpunitive
purpose made in support of the "no extensions" rider, News America did
not adequately demonstrate that it was singled out for punishment. But
since these statements of neutral purpose are irrelevant in the case of an
appropriation of limited duration, 190 hostile statements by legislative
sponsors take on added weight. In short, the atypical feature of appro-
priations-their limited duration--complicates the search for the general
purposes of legislation that can only affect a narrow class during its life
cycle.
Because temporary extensions of the cross-ownership rule last eigh-
teen months, the parties to be affected by the annual reenactment of the
"no extensions" rider are necessarily known to Congress. This fact is
troublesome. On the one hand, Congress should be able to define the
contours of the cross-ownership rule so long as the rule means the same
thing to similarly situated publishers. On the other hand, the limited
duration of the "no extensions" rider raises the specter of selective en-
forcement of the cross-ownership rule based on legislative tastes.
186. In fact, although deeply disturbed by these post-enactment statements, the News America
court "pass[ed] over petitioner's claim of illicit purpose." 844 F.2d at 810.
187. Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 176 n.16 (1981). But cf Andrus v. Shell Oil
Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980) (post-enactment statements "should not be rejected out of hand").
188. Post-enactment statements made by the same Congress may be accorded more weight be-
cause the "oft-repeated warning that 'the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for
inferring the intent of an earlier one'" is not applicable. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980) (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)
(emphasis added)). Moreover, post-enactment statements by a bill's sponsor are accorded special
deference. See Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 203-06 (1982); see also Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 262
(1986); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 567 (1984); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 530-31 (1982).
189. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 856 n.15
(1984) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960)). This standard is reminiscent of the
"but for" test in equal protection jurisprudence. See supra note 178; see also Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7 (1981) ("We will not invalidate a state statute under the
Equal Protection Clause merely because some legislators sought to obtain votes for the measure on
the basis of [an impermissible purpose].").
190. See supra note 157.
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In the end, while appropriations riders may not violate the bill of
attainder clause, the image of governmental fairness and neutrality is un-
dermined by such short-term enactments. Appropriations are one-year
statutes that can cause identifiable groups to suffer relative harms. Limi-
tation riders that alter or freeze executive rulemaking schemes therefore
can raise both specificity and intent-to-punish concerns. Because Con-
gress cannot effectively debate riders included in last-minute continuing
resolutions,' 91 limitation riders included in such measures give the ap-
pearance of a legislative star chamber inflicting secretive, unconditional
punishment. Congress, to cure this defect, should-to the extent practi-
cable' 92-make policy by enacting authorizations of general
applicability.
CONCLUSION
This article has been something of a whirlwind tour of legal and
practical problems raised by continuing resolutions. The bottom line is
that Congress should disfavor continuing resolutions. While the broad
scope of recent continuing resolutions allows congressional leaders to
make necessary compromises across the range of government spending
issues, the continuing resolution funding device is undemocratic and
therefore comes at too high a price. Moreover, continuing resolutions
disrupt the balance of power between Congress and the President, and
dispel the essential fiction of fair governance.
The confluence of Gramm-Rudman and 1974 Budget Act proce-
dures, unfortunately, makes the continued use of this funding device all
too likely. To eliminate existing incentives for omnibus resolutions, Con-
gress must reexamine the federal budget process itself.
191. Limitation riders enacted in regular appropriations are often subject to contentious debate.
See Devins, supra note 6, at 464-65.
192. On occasion, limitation riders may be the only legislative means available to Congress to
further its policymaking agenda. See iL
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